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Wiley Rutledge is one of Louis Pollak's heroes. The parallel
elements in their lives are obvious. Both were professors, deans,
and judges. Like Mr. Justice Rutledge, Judge Pollak is warmhearted, thoughtful, independent, and stubborn.
Beyond these secondary characteristics, however, there is a
genuine likeness between the two men. Justice Rutledge's term on
the Supreme Court was short. But his opinions, few as they are,
shine with a special quality. They are ordered by a sure feel for
the judicial function in constitutional cases. And they reflect a
determined effort to give full weight to all the values, all the policies,
and all the principles necessarily at stake in a given controversy.
Rutledge could not share Justice Black's quest for absolutes, his
willingness to simplify in the naive hope that simple rules would
fetter future judges. Nor could Rutledge accept Justice Frankfurter's equally naive thesis that if the judges should refuse to meet
their constitutional responsibility, they would thereby inspire Congress and the President to do their own constitutional duties.
Neither fundamentalist nor fain6ant, Rutledge's view of the
constitutional system is truer to history. So is Pollak's. Both men
see the Constitution as a whole and as a system, a living organism
animated by the shared values and aspirations that make us a
nation. And they see the judicial function as integral to the
dynamics of the Constitution, legitimate, democratic, and, within its
proper limits, essential to the health of the constitutional process.
To Rutledge and Pollak, America is not a geographical expression but a moral idea. They believe that it is the duty of each
participant in the constitutional endeavor-citizen and public official
alike-to do the task which falls to his hand with all his might.
Equally, they see it as his duty to carry out his effort with full
respect for the nature of the Constitution as a shaping and directive
principle, a process of tension without end dominated by the goal
of personal liberty.
Rutledge and Pollak are adherents to the legal philosophy without a name-the school which has prevailed in American law at
least since Marshall's time, so familiar that it is rarely described or
reduced to formal statements. For long periods, it has functioned
almost inarticulately, through the conditioned reflexes of priests and
parishioners alike. At other times, monks and bishops have atf Sterling Professor of Law and Public Affairs, Yale Law School
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tempted to account for it, usually in terms that fail to explain its
most striking and important features. But the pattern survives,
stronger than ever, gaining in acceptance through all the ups and
downs of its history.
I look forward to Judge Pollak's work, confident that it will be
wise, cogent, and influential. There can never be too many good
judges. And there are never enough great ones. Judge Pollak will
surely be a good judge, in the line of professorial judges like Swan,
Charles Clark, Goodrich, Magruder, Hays, and Arant. We can hope
that he will be a great judge. Whatever the outcome of his encounter with Fate in these terms, Judge Pollak will provide us, as
Rutledge did, with serious and fully considered opinions that will
earn the sustained attention of our best students. He may never
be stylish or fashionable. He will not be the white haired judge
either of the National Review or the New York Review of Books.
But his opinions will reflect a powerful and realistic constitutional
philosophy; reverence for what has been accomplished already in
the name of the Constitution; and a determination to leave the Constitution a little stronger and a little better when he does retire in
the fullness of time.
As he starts on what we hope will be a long and fruitful phase
of a distinguished career, we salute him.

